摘要： This paper investigates the problem of proportionally fair double-sided energy auction involving buying and selling agents. The grid is assumed to be operating under islanded mode. A distributed auction algorithm that can be implemented by an aggregator, as well as a possible approach by which the agents may approximate price anticipation is considered. Equilibrium conditions arising due to price anticipation is analyzed. A modi?ed auction to mitigate the resulting loss in ef?ciency due to such behavior is suggested. This modi?ed auction allows the aggregate social welfare of the agents to be arbitrarily close to that attainable with price taking agents. Next, equilibrium conditions when the aggregator collects a surcharge price per unit of energy traded is examined. A bi-objective optimization problem is identi?ed that takes into account both the agents’ social welfare as well as the aggregator’s revenue from the surcharge. The results of extensive simulations, which corroborate the theoretical analysis, are reported.